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CONSTRUCTION AND DECONSTRUCTION OF WORK IN BRAZIL: FROM CONCILIATION TO COUP[1]

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Introduction

After a period of stability and growth in the first decade of the 2000's, Brazil entered a cycle of profound economic, social, political and institutional crisis. Just as its period of bonanza was largely due to international conditions, the deeper causes of the current Brazilian crisis have strong global components. They are part of the movement made by capitalism in the last decades of the twentieth century, seeking to boost its cycles of accumulation and deviate, even if temporarily, from its own limits, expressed in crises with profound global repercussions. In the era when the globalization and financialization of capital has reached its high point, these crises have become, around the globe, warmer and deeper.

The advent of the 2008 crisis and its impact on the different countries of the globe is part of this process. Initially, it reached the central capitalist countries, such as the United States, Japan, Germany, England, France, Italy, among others. But, given its global, unequal and combined conformation, it was designed for the various nations of the Asian world, also reaching intermediate development countries, such as those that make up the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and, more sharply, the whole periphery of the system.

The repercussions of the crisis in Brazil, considered at first as "small wave" by the government, were little by little undermining the project of the Workers' Party (PT), in force since 2003, with the inauguration of Luiz Inácio da Silva, Lula. Implemented throughout Lula's two consecutive presidential mandates and, from 2011, by his successor, Dilma Rousseff, the project began to show clear signs of collapse in 2013, when street rebellions reached its peak in June.

This clear fatigue of the project, accentuated by the persistence and deepening of the global economic crisis, would lead to the streets a large sector of working youth. Subject to the growing precariousness of the labor market, unable to access quality education, left at the mercy of a public health system scrapped, and without any security over the future, the increase in public transport tariffs has become a kind of catalyst for the discontent of this layer of young people.

[1] This chapter is a version, with some changes, of *Chronicle of a Defeat Foretold: The PT Administrations from Compromise to the Coup*, *Latin American Perspectives*, V.1, p. 85–104, January 1, 2019. ISSN 0094–582X.

In essence, the movement of these young people and the strong wave that the country experienced in the same year reflected the failure of a project that, just as it sprang from the hopes and desires of many for change, was not able to carry them out, quickly showing their limits and contradictions. The Brazilian reality was then beginning to be naked in depth and, with it, regardless of what would be the poor advances, the social and political failure of the PT governments.

What were the main components of the policies developed by the PT, with an impact on social and labor rights, between 2003 and 2016? Did they have prevalent positive and forward or negative elements and limitations? Did they ultimately result in a victory by the social forces of labor or a failure that amplified the deep crisis that struck the PT governments? The purpose of this chapter is to provide a critical balance of this experience, in order to present some answers to these questions.

From confrontation to conciliation

Brazil played a prominent role in the labor and trade union struggles in the 1980, managing to slow down the implantation of neoliberalism, which has already been expanded by several countries in Latin America, such as Chile, Argentina, Mexico, among others. While in the North countries, neoliberalism broke out, in Brazil, in that decade, we walked in the opposite direction of these regressive tendencies.

Thus, if for the capital this was considered a "lost decade", for the trade union and popular movements, this was a "victorious decade."

After the historic strikes of ABC Paulista, in the late 1970's, with the emergence of the so-called "new syndicalism", strikes spread across the country, reaching broad contingents of the working class. The class unions and countless social movements were widely used, which meant a period of dissemination of large-scale social and political struggles (Santana, 1999; Antunes, 2004, 2006b, 2015; Praun, 2005, 2006, 2012; Antunes, Santana, 2014).

In a short period of time, indicating the organizational and mobility strength of the working class, the 1980 would also boost, as part of the intense social mobilization in the country, the foundation and growth of a working and union extraction party, the PT and the Single Workers' Center (CUT). It would also gradually produce the increasing insertion of an important part of its militants and union activists in the structures of the Brazilian state.

The electoral victories achieved by the PT, if on the one hand reflected the consolidation of a social base largely forged in the social mobilizations of the 1980's, also became a point of important support for the strengthening of a political practice that began to characterize, in the 1990's, due to the concern to formulate proposals considered to be viable institutionally, more "propositive", as it was said then.

The evaluations of the PT's majority leadership on the reasons for the defeat of Lula's candidacy in the 1989 presidential elections would accentuate this tendency, expressed in the following years, among other initiatives, in the participation of CUT in 1992 and 1993, in the chambers of the Automotive Sector (Galvão, 1996; Praun, 2012). This participation made evident the search not only for demonstrating active posture in "[...] Elaboration of an industrial policy on democratic bases [...]", as defended at the time the Metalworkers Union of the ABC (1992, p. 5), but the willingness to reach the central power, by institutional

means, and without endangering the established social order and structure. This provision could be observed more clearly ten years later, during the 2002 election, which resulted in Lula's first presidential term. During the electoral dispute, the PT published the "Letter to the Brazilian People" (Silva, 2002), signed by Lula, in which guarantees were given to the financial market of a future policy of controlling the economy and of respecting the "contracts and obligations of the country".

During the years that separated the experiences with the Sector Chambers and the 2002 elections, measures for flexibilization of production and work (establishment of the time and day banks; adoption of mechanisms aimed at multipurpose and multifunctional work; reduction of the entry floor of professional categories; flexibilization of remuneration through the policy of participation in results, among others) began to be defended and incorporated with respect to collective agreements signed by unions affiliated to CUT, having as the starting point of this practice the metallurgical syndicalism of ABC Paulista (Praun, 2005, 2006, 2012).

During the 1990's, amid the strengthening of neo-liberalism and the measures aimed at restructuring production and work, which would devastate the world of Brazilian labor, a trade union practice centered on the presentation of "viable" proposals would be consolidated within the CUT, to avoid the confrontation between capital and labor, privileging negotiation in detriment of mobilization. Consequently, it sought the viability of electoral victory through the construction of a pact, articulating the different factions of the ruling class, for the management of Brazilian capitalism.

Lula governments: PT in power

On the occasion of the electoral victory of Lula's candidacy, in 2002, after two consecutive mandates of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994–2002), Brazil had become a very diverse country, now inserted in a national and international context distinct from that observed in the previous decades. This is because Lula's election occurred when transformism (Gramsci, 1989) was already impregnating the political practice of the PT, which gradually transformed it into a variant of Party of Order (Marx, 1974), increasingly moderate and institutionalized in its methods, practices and actions.

When his first candidacy in 1989, Lula and the PT seated in a sharp and upward movement, had an acute program of change that was defeated at the polls. In 2002, in the midst of a world of labor and movement of workers devastated, and in alliance with conservative sectors, Lula and the PT emerged victorious from the polls.

Neoliberalism, which developed in the 1990's with Fernando Collor (1990–1992) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), had largely deserted the country, and the PT it was no longer a party centrally aimed at the interests of the working class. It has increasingly oscillated between resistance to neoliberalism and the acceptance and defense of a new, more polyclassist pragmatics[2].

[2] We take back here several ideas that are presented especially in Antunes (2004, 2006b, 2015).

The first Lula government, beginning in January 2003, was characterized, then, more by continuity than by the rupture with neoliberalism, since it also developed policies with clear similarities to those proposed by social liberalism, which flourished from the experiment carried out by *Tony* Blair*'s New Labour*[3].

It is worth noting that, during the first term, the economic policy developed by Lula never questioned the hegemony of financial capital. Far from this, it followed strictly the pillars indicated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), thus maintaining the structural elements that preserved capitalism and which blamed our bourgeois social formation.

As Lula himself indicated at a rally held in Fortaleza, during the 2012 municipal elections, "I sometimes wonder why people criticize Lula so much. You see, if it depended on making money, the entrepreneurs of this country every day had to light a candle for God because they never made as much money as they did in my government" (Cabral, 2012). Lula adds to his speech that this would have been the path that made progress possible in terms of increasing the number of formal jobs in the country.

What were the guiding policies of the PT governments? Let us now look more closely at some of them. We will take into account, in terms of limits, possibilities and contradictions, policies on employment, trade unions and the fight against poverty. In the final part, we will analyze the outcome of the PT governments with the parliamentary-legal-media coup that put an end to their fourteen years of experience in the federal executive.

Employment policy

Lula's victory, despite the broad alliance that supported him, opened up a number of expectations about the structural changes he promised long ago. However, the electoral process took place amid the foreshadowings of one economic crisis. Faced with the possibility of Lula's victory, part of the investment focused on financial speculation threatened to leave the country. With the "Letter to Brazilians" (Silva, 2016), as we have already indicated, Lula sought to reassure the market indicating that the bases of stabilization would be maintained.

The Lula government, in its two terms (2003–2006 and 2007–2010), has very closely followed the economic policy of the previous government, even though it is nuanced by a social-liberal perspective. Among other measures, he preserved the financial capital institutions through the maintenance of the primary surplus. With regard to labor legislation, in addition to the introduction of the recovery of pension contributions of retirees – which generated him a great deal of dissension in the trade unionism of public workers, one of the constitutive pillars of the CUT at its origin – tried, at the end of the first term, to enable a broad trade union and labor reform, despite the strong opposition of both employers' syndicates and union centers and those entities linked to workers (Antunes, 2006b, 2014; Galvão, 2007).

Given the international conjuncture, it was accumulating positive economic indexes. In general, the Lula government was characterized by low inflation and reduced unemployment. Although it is necessary to discuss the type and quality of jobs created, in

[3] See the rich and comprehensive critical balance of neoliberalism and its distinct variants in Pradella and Marois (2015).

this regard they are data that draw attention. In the period between 1998 and 2007, a rate of employment rate of 56% was obtained. In 1998, the Brazilian formal market had 24.5 million jobs. This total rose, in 2002, to the level of 28.7 million, reaching 37.6 million in 2007. The best results obtained in this field were obtained between 2003 and 2007, when the majority of these jobs were created and the unemployment level registered a very sensitive drop, from a rate of 12% in 2003 to 9% in 2007 (Santana, 2012). When the world crisis hit the central capitalist countries, the Lula government has taken measures to encourage, through this action, the resumption of economic growth through the expansion of the international market. To this end, among other measures, the government reduced taxes in the automotive, domestic and construction sectors, all of which had a strong incorporation of labor force.

If, as Pochmann points out (2012), in the 1990's we are going through a period of strong reduction in formalized jobs,[4] in the next decade under the governments of Lula and the beginning of Dilma's first term, 21 million jobs were created, which attests to the wide incorporation of workers into the labor market.

The expansion of the jobs, however, kept particularities. It should be noted that 94.8% of workers incorporated into the formal market perceived a low remuneration (1.5 minimum wage per month). The activities that grew most over this period were: services, with 6.1 million new jobs; followed by trade workers, with 2.1 million; construction, with 2 million; clerks, with 1.6 million; of the textile and clothing industry, with 1.3 million, and of the public sector, with 1.3 million (Pochmann, 2012; Antunes, 2014).

As Pochmann states (2012, p. 32), these professions totaled "[...] 14.4 million new jobs, equivalent to 72.4% of all occupations with remuneration of up to 1.5 minimum monthly salary". It is also worth adding that the expansion of female work was significant, reaching almost 60% of occupations, with concentration among women in the 25 to 34 years old.

The precariousness and the level of labor degradation could also be evidenced from other indicators that provide a panoramic view of the Brazilian labor market. Throughout the Lula government, as Braga (2015) highlights,

> [...] the number of accidents and deaths at work has increased and the rate of employment turnover has increased [...]. And how would it be different if the main drivers of the current post-Fordist *and* financialized *accumulation regime* are the heavy and civil construction industry, the agro-industry and the service sector? Moreover, despite recent economic growth, the Brazilian social structure did not exceed its semi-peripheral condition, which implies the combination of a large number of cheap jobs with a low investment rate in science and technology, strengthening business development.

In view of this whole context, it should be said that the PT governments managed to increase the number of workers and formalization, and thus reduce the unemployment rates, however, failed to eliminate the conditions of vulnerability that accentuate the

[4] According to Pochmann, "[...] 11 million jobs were created, of which 53.6% did not foresee remuneration. In the income range of up to 1.5 minimum wage there was a net reduction of almost300 thousand jobs" (idem, p. 27)

precarious labor force in Brazil, exemplified in the high indices of informality and in the growing outsourcing quotas. Thus, deregulation and the enlargement of subcontracting forms remained, even if at lower levels than those in force in the 1990.

From this contradictory process, perhaps the most significant was the enormous expansion of the new service proletariat, which has developed in terms of both the productive restructuring and the significant privatization process of state-owned enterprises and public services. The enormous expansion of work in *call centers* and *telemarketing*, information and communication technology (ICT) companies, hypermarkets, hotel industry, etc., increasingly inserted in the process of capital appreciation, generated the birth - the birth of a new service proletariat, the info proletariat or *the cybertariat* (Antunes; Braga, 2009; Huws, 2003).

If, during the 1980, the number of outsourced workers (subcontractors) was relatively small, in the following decades this number grew, constituting an expressive contingent of workers without employment and without formal registration, suffering from high turnover rates, sometimes on the margins of labor legislation, redesigning the morphology of labor in Brazil (Antunes, 2006b, 2014, 2015; Druck, 1999, 2011; Druck; Franco, 2007).[5]

It was with this program (social, trade union and jobs) that Lula implemented a policy of very successful conciliation for a long period, having strong support from the different sectors of the company, greatly benefiting the various fractions of the large capital, specifically, the financial and industrial that, as we know, hold strong symbiosis among themselves, although sometimes they have disputed spaces in the conduct of government economic policy, along with the agribusiness sector and the bourgeois fractions, all participants of the Lula's supporters' project.

In the industrial sector, considering only two examples, we see that the automotive sector has reached successive production records, and the almost extinct naval industry has consistently reappeared in the scenario, assuming a prominent position among the largest in the world in the sector (Santana, 2012).

At the top, the big capitals have benefited as few times in the recent history of the country, in almost all its segments. At the base of the social pyramid, the PT government (and its broad coalition) implemented a much broader social policy than its predecessors, although predominantly of a welfare profile, aiming to minimize to some extent the Brazilian misery. Portions of the most impoverished base of our public social pyramid have risen some steps, especially in the sphere of wage-based consumer goods, at the expense, however, as we can see later, of its enormous indebtedness.

As far as the minimum wage is concerned, it has experienced its greatest real growth. The real wage mass growth of the worker was observed from 2003. This mass remained at stagnation levels in the period 1998/2002, with a value of approximately R$ 36 billion. From 2003 onwards, the annual growth of the same was stable, for example, to R$ 52 billion in 2007. Such a situation had clear impacts on the recovery of the purchasing power of the

[5] In a study conducted by Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies (DIEESE), the sectors considered "typically outsourced" corresponded to 25.5% of formal jobs in Brazil, and their remuneration 27.1% lower than that of the other formalized employees. As far as the working day is concerned, outsourced workers work on average 3 hours longer and their length of stay at work is 55.5% shorter than that of the other employees. Its turnover rate is 44.9%, while in the other companies is 22.0% (DIEESE–CUT, 2011). See also Wealth and Poverty of Work, Vol. III, *op. cit.*

popular classes. In numbers, in eight years, the minimum wage increased from R$ 200 to R$ 510, thus presenting an increase of about 150% (although it is a very low minimum wage, when compared to the values indicated by DIEESE) (Santana, 2012).

Thus, the policy of preserving and expanding the minimum wage also allowed his second government to overcome the deep crisis at the end of his first term and advance intensively in his popularity levels. But it is necessary to emphasize that none of the structuring pillars of Brazilian misery was effectively faced. And this background was accentuated at the end of the first Dilma government and the beginning of her second, when the Brazilian crisis intensified.

It is also important to demarcate the mediations of this process. On the one hand, the PT government, predominantly from 2006, boosted assistance policies, as well as the real increase in the minimum wage and, supported by these initiatives, built its support base with the most impoverished segments of society. On the other hand, since his first term, he advanced in the reform of the pension system and instituted two laws that have reached labor rights (Krein; Biavaschi, 2015).

The first of them, Law 11.101, of 2/9/2005, establishes, in the words of Souto Maior (2014, p. 5), the "labor debt". With the new rules, in situations of judicial, extrajudicial recovery, and bankruptcy of companies, the labor credit is no longer a priority over the others. Only credits at the limit of 150 minimum wages remain priority over the others. The Law thus reflects the logic of distribution between the employer and the worker of business risks (Souto Maior, 2014).

The second, Law 10.820, of 12/17/2003, started the process of regulating the paycheck loan. Such legislation, in addition to protecting financial institutions, giving them the security of receiving loans and direct debit financing on payroll, provided support to a government program that, over many years, has enabled itself to be anchored in the incentive to consumption associated with the indebtedness of workers (Krein; Biavaschi, 2015)

The trade union question

It is not by chance, therefore, under the leadership of Lula and his planners, during the first PT government, at the end of 2004 and early 2005, that the proposal for union reform was strengthened. Lula's electoral victory brought to power a generation of forged union militants, like him, in the so-called "new syndicalism" and in the criticism of the legacy of the so-called "union subservience". Promise of campaign, the reform of trade union legislation entered the agenda. The Ministry of Labor, based on the organization of the National Labour Forum (FNT), integrated, tripartite, by representatives of workers, patronage and government, sought to develop a new union project for the country.[6]

There was a certain demand on such changes by the trade union sectors since the governments of FHC, who wanted, along with the employer, to carry out a labor reform without providing the unions with new possibilities of restructuring and mobilization to liberate them from the controls laid down in the Consolidation of Labor Laws (CLT).

[6] For details on the assembly and operation of the FNT, see, among others, Bargas and Oliveira (2005), Druck (2006) and Santana (2009).

In the view of its proponents in government, reform would be a step toward a broader change, designed not only as "mere legislative amendment", but as "[...] a broad legal-institutional reorganization of a systemic character that, from the normative point of view", aimed to "[...] involve the right to trade union, labor law, labor public administration bodies and labor justice" (MTE, 2005, s/d).

The set of reforms in this area, intended by the government, as expressed in its documents (MTE, 2003; MTE, 2005), came in the sense of o make laws and institutions of work more compatible with what would be the new social, political and economic conjuncture experienced by the country. In line with these objectives, the project's "Explanatory Statement" indicated that:

> The reform of the Trade Union legislation is one of the most expensive commitments to change this management, due to the structural delay in the current standards. Allowing a truly free and autonomous trade union organization in relation to the State, in addition to fostering collective bargaining as a fundamental instrument for conflict resolution, are essential objectives for strengthening democracy and stimulating authentic representativeness (MTE, 2005, s/d).

However, the draft law that dealt with the issue, despite some points of consensus, generated more dissent and many doubts. It has come to legislation exactly at a critical moment in national political life, marked by scandals carried out by exponential figures of the government and the party of the president.

Obviously used by the media and the opposition, it produced, from the denunciations of corruption of the so-called "Mensalão" [Political Bribe Scheme] case, a certain paralysis of legislative life as such, carrying energies to the Parliament Commissions of Inquiry (CPIs). The government, also severely impacted by the dispositions, with narrow margin of action, chose to slice the bill of labor reform, following up, in retail, only a few points such as, for example, the recognition of the union centers (Santana, 2009).

Although this proposal for labor reform has been hindered by the political crisis, as well as by the strong opposition by various trade union actors, both to the right, to the center and to the left wings, it was emblematic of the deeper sense of conciliation present in the first Lula government.

The proposals that emerged from the FNT negotiations went against the principles that guided the creation of CUT, aimed at an independent trade unionism, detached from the State which, to a great extent, was at the basis of the constitution of the so-called "new syndicalism". In addition to a set of proposals aimed at flexibilization of labor rights, it was also aimed at benefiting the union summits to the detriment of the operational bases, to transfer the exercise of negotiation to the central and its directions, restricting the action of the unions and the basic assemblies.

Moreover, the central units would be measured and defined by their representation, hindering the organizational life of more autonomous entities, since the proposal came to contemplate minimum limits for the recognition of the representation of the unions. Finally, it established that the collection of the Trade Tax and other contributions or assistance fees would be replaced by the so-called "Collective Negotiation Contribution" (up to 1% of the worker's net income in the previous year), directly impeding the desire for autonomous co-

operation, Free and voluntary workers for the maintenance of unions (Antunes, 2006b; Santana, 2009).

It is worth mentioning about this process, which marks the beginning of the first Lula government, that the trade union verticalism, summit practices and excessive bureaucratism, which the CUT criticized so much during its first years of existence, were impregnated in this proposal of union reform both through an attempt to significantly reduce what was still preserved from basic union organization, as by the abandonment of the tripod freedom, autonomy and union dependency, guiding principles of the so-called "new syndicalism" and, therefore, considered vital and non-negotiable in its origin (Antunes; Silva, 2015; Antunes; Santana, 2014).

As a result of the controversy and resistance generated within the trade unions movement, no progress was made in the attempt to restrict the participation of the unions and the basic general meetings in the negotiation processes. But part of the measures ended up being contemplated by Law 11.648, of 2008, which legalized the Brazilian trade union centers, establishing the requirements for official recognition. The Law also established, by amending the CLT, new criteria for the distribution of the Trade Union Tax in order to contemplate the centers.

It is also important to demarcate the context in which the new policy of control of syndicalism and its twofold meaning has developed. On the one hand, the union summit began to occupy, during the Lula's administration, important positions in the high state bureaucracy (in the ministries, in the councils of state companies and also of privatized companies). On the other hand, the incorporation of the centrals into the official trade union structure enabled both the integration of these entities to the Deliberative Board of the Worker Support Fund (CODEFAT), a tripartite body responsible for the management of the Worker Support Fund (FAT), such as receiving funds directly linked to FAT or other state funds. These mechanisms, in view of a scenario marked by union oneness at the base and union pluralism at the domes, strengthened and brought even closer the main union centers of the Lula's government.

The union universe also changed significantly between the first and second Lula's government, suffering a strong reconfiguration. In addition to CUT, the CTB (Central of Workers of Brazil),[7] of the Trade Union Force, founded in 1991, with an ideological profile on the right, but part of the union support base of the Lula government, the trade union spectrum also included small centrals that sought to expand their space, such as the CGTB (General Central of Workers of Brazil), the UGT (General Union of Workers), the New Central, some of them with small level of union representation, heirs of those which were from the "old syndicalism" linked to the State and that saw in the approximation with the government the possibility of expanding resources and state funds.

Subsequently, in open opposition to the Lula's and Dilma's governments, was CONLUTAS (National Coordination of Struggles), an entity founded in 2004 that, in 2010, became CSP-Conlutas (Central and Popular Trade Union). It was part of the same process the birth of the so-called INTERSINDICAL movement, originating in 2006, and which then was divided into two strands. These trade unions, unlike all the others mentioned above, refused any kind of appeal from the "old trade unionism" of the state.

[7] Formed in its origin by the Syndical Classicist Chain, which disjoined CUT in 2007 to create its own central.

Not for nothing, they are becoming established in the first years of the Lula's government, based on trade union entities that break with the CUT and stand in opposition to the PT government. It is part of this process the accession to the new centrals, especially the CSP-Conlutas, of a significant number of unions linked to the federal public functionalism, whose base was heavily hit by the pension reform and the so-called university reform, forwarded by Lula at the beginning of his first presidential term.

In addition to the opposition to the PT government and the rescue of the independence of the union entities against the State, other characteristics of these centrals deserve attention. The first, the CSP-Conlutas, defends, from its origin, the establishment of a central that brings together not only the traditional trade unions, but also the trade union oppositions, youth organizations, popular movements, as well as those set up around the struggle against the oppression of women, black men and women, LGBT, etc. Thus, it is sought an instrument of struggle capable of agglutinating and representing a portion of the working class increasingly complex and heterogeneous the result of the impact of neoliberalism and the process of productive restructuring on the world of work.

The second variant, INTERSINDICAL, with a more sharply trade union profile, sought to rescue the principles of a "trade union by base", however, finding itself clearly divided between the creation or not of a new central.

Throughout this reconfiguration framework, the CUT's trajectory and its transformation as a critical and independent trade union center in an entity strongly attuned to the actions and policies of the Lula's government deserves to be noted.[8] Such repositioning only served once again to disorient the trade union movement in the fight and opposition to neoliberalism, then in its new social-liberal variant.

Carrying out a significant shift from the historical interests of the working class to the defense of a more negotiating action and agreement, the CUT has distanced itself from its original union and political project, which has progressively disregarded the proposals and actions of the Central. Even more complicated was the fact that, by acting this way, it ended up weakening the syndical struggle and unpreparing the workers for trade union actions of resistance and confrontation.

Despite being fought by the CUT for years, the state trade unionism gave signs of strong revitalization, added to a pro-positive component. The negotiating world, state dependence (political, ideological and financial) and class conciliation policy under Lula's command became even more intense, distancing the trade union movement from what, in recent times, had been positively designated as "new trade unionism", bringing it closer to a kind of state trade unionism (Antunes; Silva, 2015).

As Braga points out (2015), "[...] the Lula's syndicalism has transformed itself not only into an asset administrator of the bourgeois state, but into a key actor in the arbitration of capitalist investment in the country itself." Preoccupied with the profitability of the funds that he began to administer, as well pointed out Francisco de Oliveira (2008), and with its members occupying various positions in the structure of the Brazilian State, the high trade union bureaucracy "was financialized", hat is, associated his interests, as a privileged social

[8] The fact that its former President Luiz Marinho, component of the Syndical Articulation, is raised to the position of Minister of Labour of the Lula government between June 2005 and March 2007, is symptomatic of this new political stance adopted by CUT, leaving the position to take over the Ministry of Social Security until June 2008.

layer, to the accumulation cycle of financial capital that was developed. Thus, the militant PT of the strikes and social movements of the 1980 and part of the 1990, moved away from its origins, becoming a smaller partner of the capitalist power block in Brazil (Braga, 2015).

Social policies and the new social base of support

The action of the PT governments maintained a certain centrality in terms of actions of social programs that could have effective impacts on poverty reduction. And this has been felt over time.

The work of young people served as one of the beacons of the government's action at its beginning. Launched in 2003, the First Employment Program, however did not meet the expected targets, suffering deactivation in 2006. As for the eradication of labor in conditions similar to that of slave, the Lula government continued with the measures already undertaken in the previous government, achieving some positive advances. On the other hand, programs such as Zero Hunger and Bolsa Familia[9] were important brands of PT governments, with significant effects, especially in the second case.

At the end of his first term, Lula made important changes in his social policies in the search for regaining support that was being eroded, mainly due to the profound open political crisis with the so-called "Mensalão", which could pose risks to his re-election in 2006 (Antunes, 2006a).

One of the most expressive changes occurred with the expansion of the Bolsa – Família. Harsh and distinct criticisms were directed to the PBF, especially by the latter, in the sense that it presented a merely assistance axis, without providing an alternative that changed the structure of Brazilian misery, which could be done, for example, through a deep agrarian reform, or by the taxation of financial capital and large fortunes, etc.

If the most conservative criticisms justified that, by receiving assistance from the government, the assisted workers would no longer seek employment, the advocates of the project pointed out that, in addition to removing many from the poverty situation, the Bolsa Família indirectly guaranteed that they could also bargain entry into the market in a less precarious situation.

The origin of the Program at national level dates back to the unification and improvement of "income transfer actions" already developed under the FHC government.[10] This is a Program that, throughout the Lula administration, has had high repercussions among the poorest sections of the Brazilian population, with a very low cost to the Brazilian public budget when compared to the volume destined to the payment of public debt interest to the banks. As demonstrated by the data from 2008, as determined by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA), "[...] The cost of the PBF represents only 0.38% of

[9] This program is based on the transfer of income from the fulfillment of certain conditions. Aiming at the integration and unification of programs already in force in the previous government, the Bolsa Familia consists of financial assistance from the government to low-income families. These are defined upon having a per *capita* income from R$ 10,00 to R$1.520,00. To live up to the stipend, the families need to keep their children and/or dependents with school attendance and up-to-date in terms of vaccination.

[10] This program, created in 2003, replaced the Community Solidarity Program, established by the FHC government in 1995, to combat hunger and poverty, in what would be its structural basis. According to official data, at the time of the program's creation, there were about 44 million people facing hunger.

GDP and about only 3% of the total expenditure on social security and welfare benefits of the country" (Pochmann, 2010, p. 8).

The Program aimed to reach the poorest 20% of the Brazilian population, electing the 10% range as a priority. It aimed, in this way, to impact the indicators of inequality through the elimination of the so-called "excessive inequality." This "excessive inequality", in turn, was identified from the comparison between income appropriation indicators of countries considered with a level of development similar to the Brazilian one (Barros; Carvalho; Mendonça, 2010).

In 2006, the year that marks the end of Lula's first presidential term, the PBF expanded its scope, from the 3.6 million of families[11] directly affected by the Program in January 2004 to 11 million families. The number of families served remained stable in the years 2007 and 2008, being again expanded throughout 2009, when it began to encompass 13.7 million families (Soares; Sátyro, 2010). However, data on the number of people served by the Program provide a better dimension of its repercussion. Accordingly, the study carried out by Costanzi and Fagundes (2010, p. 264),

> In March 2010, the number of people who were in Bolsa Família reached 48,680 million. Taking into account the population estimate, in 2009, of 191.480 million, it means that the PBF served about a quarter of the country's total population (25.4%). This percentage varied from 14.9% in the Southeast (the lowest value) to 45.6% in the Northeast (the highest value). [...] The greatest coverage of the program in relation to the total population is, in particular, in the municipalities of the North and Northeast regions, although there are cities with high coverage in the other regions.

This welfare court social policy, which was the main flag of the PT government, was considered exemplary by the World Bank. Focused less on the organized working class, the social base of Lula's origin, the Program began to reach the most impoverished sectors, usually more dependent on State aid to survive.

The data from 2010, obtained through the Unified Registry, control system and cross-checking of beneficiaries of social programs of the federal government, show that the profile of the beneficiaries of the PBF meets the general profile of the Brazilian social inequality, which reserves the areas of greatest poverty for the afro-descendant population, women and young people. In all regions of the country, female participation among beneficiaries was, in April 2010, 54.2%. This index becomes even more preponderant if considered the legal responsible of the family. In this case, 92.5% are women. These responsible, in turn, concentrate on the age group from 25 to 34 years (35.5%) and the age group from 35 to 44 years (29.5%) (Costanzi; Fagundes, 2010).

When the look turns to the ethnic-racial cut-off, the data point to a population attended mainly composed of afro-descendants with 65.3% of self-declared brown and another 7.5% of black, totaling 72.8%. Data from April 2010 also point to the low number

[11] Another 4.2 million families, in January 2004, were still beneficiaries of remaining programs from the previous government, such as the *Bolsa Escola*, *Bolsa Alimentação* or *Cartão Alimentação*. The PBF was over the years, through a single register, grouping different benefits according to the family profile, which resulted in the elimination of these other programs. In 2008, only about 15 thousand families benefited from the old programs.

of beneficiaries of the Program, with 81.1% without complete elementary school, among them, 15.8% illiterate (idem).

The values received by the families benefited by the PBF vary. The minimum, called "basic benefit", updated in July 2016, corresponds to R$85.00. Other benefits, considered variable, may be added to this value, in the value of R$39.00 each. However, despite the low cost, by covering ¼ of the Brazilian population below the poverty line, the Program has important importance both from the economic point of view, providing little for those who have practically nothing, as a politician, forming for years a fundamental social base from the electoral point of view.

Acting in the same direction, as we have already indicated above, the governmental action of real increase in the minimum wage, although the readjustments kept it far below the levels provided for in the Constitution and defended by DIEESE, focused on the poorest segments of the population, reaching broader and more extreme ramifications in the world of work.

It is evident that such actions consolidated an important migration in part of the social base of the second Lula government, the most organized working class, the original basis of the PT, toward the poorest wage earners, with lower level or even without trade union and political organization, and that are in less industrialized areas of the country (Antunes, 2006a).[12]

Dilma governments: from the rise to the crisis

The Dilma's government, taken office in 2011, basically maintained the economic receipt of the second Lula's government: economic growth directed to the domestic market; encouragement to the production of *commodities* for export; reduction of taxes aimed at meeting the demands of different fractions of the capital, such as industrial, construction, etc. It has also preserved the financial policy based on high interest rates, thus ensuring, in much of its first government, the support of financial capital. It was only when the repercussions of the international crisis were accentuated in Brazil, being felt no longer as "a little ripple", that the Dilma's government rehearsed an interest reduction policy through state banks. This whole set constituted the so-called New Economic Matrix.

However, the worsening of the international economic crisis, which was no longer restricted to the countries of the North, but which also began to directly affect the so-called BRICS, was slowly undermining the bourgeois social base that supported the governments of Lula and Dilma. In addition to this central point, another proponent increased the divisions and fractures in relation to the Dilma government: 1) In the political scene, the lawsuit called "*Lava Jato* Operation" directly involved the PT and its main ally, the old PMDB, in new corruption scandals; 2) in the social universe, discontent increased with regard to the government's project and its ever-increasing distance from the social movements of the government. Social Mentions and unions that originally constituted the social base of PT (Antunes, 2015).

[12] An analysis of the municipal elections of 2016, from this perspective, indicates that, despite the massive defeat of the PT (national fall of 60% of its municipalities), had a greater possibility of resistance exactly in the spaces of greater penetration of the PBF (fall of 28%) (Mello; Carriello; Grillo, 2016).

These fissures of the project that structured the PT governments would not lead to the streets the segments of the most precarious working youth. Despite the expansion of jobs, these positions, mainly reserved for women, young and black people, further accentuated the perverse logic that has long been the Brazilian labor market: low wages and their incidence among those traditionally more discriminated segments in the labor market (Braga, 2013, 2015).

It was in this political context that, in 2013, the rebellions of June broke out. What were, then, their main causal elements?

We know that the June rebellions originated from the prepared actions, in a long period and in several capitals of the country, by the Free Fare Movement (MPL). These actions, which had as initial motivation the defense of the student free fare, gradually began to encompass the fight against the increase of the fares of public transport and in defense of urban mobility. In 2013, among them, these manifestations were expanded exponentially, starting to incorporate a varied range of flags and claims.

Perhaps we can stress that the rebellions found their root causes in a special juncture, in which broader structural elements converged and the outcrop of a latent political crisis. The interlocking among these points generated the combustion that led to the mobilizations that made the exhaustion of the PT project noticeable.

The young working population that was present and dominant in public squares denounced private and chaotic transport; degraded public health, and abandoned public education. It was in some way belated against the marketing of its everyday life.

The demonstrations also took place in a special conjuncture, marked by the organization of the Confederations Cup, when the use of public resources for private interests linked to the construction of stadiums (the so-called arenas), the whole transnational complex and the great corporations involved with football *entertainment*, allowed to emerge a profound symbiosis among FIFA, the Dilma's government, transnational corporations and the various bourgeois factions articulated with the government, in a moment of crisis.

This scenario was even more explosive, since we experienced an international context also characterized by rebellions, in which the popular masses appropriated the public space, exercising plebiscite, horizontal practices, contrary to traditional organizations, manifesting frontal opposition as to the forms of representation and invalidity in force, both in the capitalist countries of the West and in the dictatorships that were perpetuated in the Middle East.

These manifestations, which have lasted for a long period, were polymorphs and polyclassist. They began with a strong popular presence, in particular the students–who–work or the workers–who–study, along with more politicized sections of youth, urban social movements or peripheries, with left-wing parties, unions, and other social and political groups.

They also reached broad contingents of the low, middle and high classes, as well as support of dominant fractions, as the demonstrations were going to have a strong presence of more conservative, apparently apolitical sectors, with an ideological accent more to the right wing. However, if these contingencies did not lead the 2013 demonstrations[13], they quickly developed systematic campaigns against the left wings and the social movements, and

[13] See the significant set of articles on the June rebellions in Sampaio Jr. (2014).

particularly against Dilma, Lula and the PT. All this created the constraints that indicated that this new critical phase would be the one of greater depth until now experienced by the Dilma government and the previous PT governments.

A wave of strikes and rebellions

The year 2013 was not only marked by major street mobilizations. Throughout this year, the Brazilian working class has starred in an unprecedented strike wave in the history of the country. In all, according to a study carried out by DIEESE (2015), 2,050 strikes were recorded, which meant a 134% increase compared to the previous year, when 877 strikes occurred.

Another relevant data identified by the study relates to the incidence of strikes triggered in private companies. In 2013, paralisations in this sector outweighed deflated in the public sector, equivalent to 54% of the total. These strikes, with important participation of workers in the service sector, were characterized to a great extent by their defensive nature, that is, with guidelines related to "[...] defense of current working conditions, [...] respect for minimum working conditions, health and safety or against non-compliance with rights established in agreement, collective bargaining or legislation" (DIEESE, 2015, p. 8).

According to data from DIEESE (2015, p. 10), in terms of the number of suspensions, as well as, the main causes that were responsible for the outbreak of this expressive strike movement in 2012 and 2013, of about 2,900 strikes, we see that demands related to the readjustment of wages (41% in 2012 and 36% in 2013), food (2% in 2012 and 27% in 2013) and working conditions (15% in 2012 and 21% in 2013), are among the first three.

The importance assumed by demands related to working conditions, the third most present claim among the strikes of 2013, is indicative of the advance of the mechanisms of precariousness among the Brazilian working class. In the specific case of public functionalism and state-owned workers, demands of this nature appear alongside claims relating to the hiring of more employees or even those related to the employment or institution of the Plan of Positions and Wages (DIEESE, 2015).

In this sense, the year 2013 was configured as the moment that, amid the open social crisis, a wide strike movement expressed in different forms broke out, along with street mobilizations. Sometimes, the actions covered professional categories of national scope, such as those triggered by the bank. On other occasions, these mobilizations also marked short strikes, by workplaces, and can count or not on the leadership of the unions. The street sweepers' strike in Rio de Janeiro in March 2014 was perhaps one of the most emblematic of the period opened in 2013.

Thus, contrary to the alleged inaction of the working class, it was evident that the strikes marked their presence in the social and political decontamination that swept the period. Let us remember, just to stay at this juncture, that since 2012 we have witnessed the outbreak of several important movements such as, for example, in Rondônia, of the workers in the Plants of Jirau and Santo Antônio (2012) and, in Rio de Janeiro, the Road Workers (2014), of the workers in the works of the Petrochemical Complex of Rio de Janeiro (2015) and of the street sweepers (2015).

Worthy of note is that these movements, with a marked presence of the precarious working youth, were made beyond the union leadership, and that, depending on the situation, pushed them, trampled or overtook them. There are several indications of disproportions that, in the face of a certain paralysis of the trade union summit, separated directions and union bases, both in the demands, as in the forms and dynamics of struggle.

The Lula's project, which had been underway for a decade, demonstrated its fatigue and began to collapse. From public teachers to street sweepers, from banking to metallurgical workers, from health workers and from transportation to outsourced workers, in fact, a myriad of wage-earners have broken this new strike cycle which, in some way, expressed discontent with regard to precarious working conditions and wages, the struggle for expansion of achievements already ensured, or solidarity with other categories, adding to the broader protests that were present in the social and political scene of the country.

From crisis to coup: conciliation exhausted and preventive counteraction advances

It was in this critical situation that the Dilma's government reached the elections in October 2014, when the intensity of the economic crisis gave evidence of strong accentuation. Victorious, not without a fierce dispute, his second victory, which began in January 2015, bowed very quickly to the new demands of the different fractions of capital, which began to give even greater signs of dissension toward the government. The polyclassist pact, designed by Lula and supported by the PT, was coming to an end.

Seeking to prevent this movement from expanding, Dilma expanded the primary surplus; encouraged further privatization in airports, ports, etc.; increased the interest rate; it implemented a fiscal adjustment that severely penalized the working class, publicly assuming flags – such as pension reform – that were increasingly demanded by the ruling classes.

On the other hand, shortly after the electoral victory, amid the growing popular discontent, the expansion of precarious work and the development of unemployment, Dilma changed the rules for granting unemployment insurance, increasing the minimum uninterrupted working time (from 6 to 12 months), for the benefit for the first time, and also extending it in the case of new requests. If that were not enough, she promoted changes in the criteria for granting pension for death, clearly signaling that the burden of the crisis would once again be paid by the working class.

In June 2016, when the context that drew Dilma's impeachment seemed irreversible, unemployment already reached 11.5 million workers. According to IBGE, unemployment rate[14] jumped from 6.5% in the fourth quarter of 2014 to 9.5% in the first quarter of 2015,[15]

[14] In the midst of increasing unemployment, as of July 2015, the Employment Protection Program (PPE), instituted by a provisional measure by the Dilma government, was applied. The measure, considered emergency and converted into Law 13.189, allowed companies, through the allegation of financial difficulties and through collective agreement, to reduce hours and wages by up to 30%. Part of the wage loss of workers (50%), as provided for in the Law, would be compensated with funds from FAT. Companies such as Mercedes Benz, which over nearly two decades benefited from tax reductions, breaking constant productivity and sales records, have signed agreements of this nature. In August 2016, before the agreement reached an end and disrespecting the stability provided for in the EPP legislation, the automobile industry started the layoffs process. Days later, it was suspended to sign a new agreement, this time, aimed at opening another Voluntary Resignation Program (PDV).

[15] Indicators of IBGE / Continuous Pnad (DIEESE, 2016).

reaching, in June 2016, 11.3%. Along with the expansion of unemployment, the working class had seen the strong deterioration of its income, falling by 4.2%, if compared to the figures between April and June 2015, with average values approving, despite inflation, those practiced three and a half years ago.

With the worsening of the international crisis, its strong repercussion in Brazil and the consequent dizzying fall in the price of *commodities* – which were found in one of the pillars of the Brazilian economy, the different bourgeois fractions, which previously supported the PT governments, began to open the project. Thus, in addition to penalizing wage earners even harder, the Dilma's government was submerged in a strong intra-bourgeois dispute, since, in this context of crisis, the disputes around who would suffer less with the reduction of profits arising from the economic framework were expanded. This situation of instability was also greatly expanded by the outbreak of Operation Lava Jato, which pushed the Dilma's government to a situation that led it to the final outcome of the impeachment.

On August 31st, 2016, the Federal Senate put the last point in the work that removed Dilma Rousseff and the PT from power, occupied for 14 years. Faced with the advance of the crisis and Operation Lava Jato, the PMDB, until recently preferred ally of the PT in the government, preferred the path of the conspiracy, dealing with the coup of parliamentary character. In one of the most depressing moments in the history of parliament in Brazil, the elected vice president, Michel Temer, replaced Dilma Rousseff, becoming president illegitimately. While the economic scenario was favorable, Brazil seemed to go well, but with the worsening of the economic, social, political and institutional crisis and, with the impulse of Operation Lava Jato, which hit some political corruption cores that were in charge of the party and even of the government, the project demonstrated its limitations and collapsed. All this deeply reviewed the previous "positive scenario", visceral breaking the policy of agreement between the various classes and class fractions that supported the Lula's project for more than a decade.

Already in the fierce elections of October 2014 it was possible to perceive a reduction in the support of the bourgeois fractions to the Dilma's government. The decrease in the interest rate carried out in a short period was sufficient to give the "warning sign" to the sectors of the rentier bourgeoisie. The worsening of the recessive situation, in turn, anticipated the pressure of the dominant fractions that began to demand profound changes in economic policy in order to adjust to the new scenario.

It was not for another reason that, immediately after the electoral victory of October 2014, Dilma, to calm the opposition, constituted a coalition ministry and appointed Joaquim Levy, representative of the big banks, to the Ministry of Finance, with the task of carrying out a hard "fiscal adjustment". The measure, however, proved unable to appease the entrepreneurial discontent. It also increased the discontentions in the popular classes that allowed Dilma to implement a program that she criticized during the electoral process. In the middle classes, especially in their most conservative sectors – from liberals, to defenders of the military dictatorship, to proto-fascists and fascists – a real hatred of the Dilma government and the PT of Lula has been unleashed.

By failing to attract these sectors and by having defended one program during the elections and applied another, attributed to the neoliberal right during the electoral process, Dilma was accused of "electoral fraud."

In the low middle layers, discontent also increased, as wages were reduced, inflation increased and unemployment reached explosive numbers. The myth of the PT government's "neo-developmentalist" project collapsed, to the exact extent that the crisis hit hard the sectors that had been included during the Lula's era.

The sectors that were still linked to the PT, made a huge effort to prevent impeachment, but the parliament, with a conservative profile – a true swamp of Brazilian politics – was already largely imbued with the proposal to remove the Dilma's government (and PT) at any price.

After more than a decade, the government's support base in the Congress was broken.

As impeachment is provided for in the Brazilian Constitution, an "ideal alternative" was managed of the ruling classes and their distinct fractions: a coup with a legal and constitutional appearance. A coup that, relying on the decisive support of the great media and decisive portions of the judiciary, supported the appearance not of a military coup, as in 1964, but a new kind of parliamentary coup, with strong judicial and media support.

Despite the Dilma's government, through the fiscal adjustment commanded by Joaquim Levy, seeks to implement the main demands of the ruling classes, the scale and scope of the crisis led them to decide for the disposal of a government that was always useful to them. In that context of deep crisis, the classes that once supported the mandates of the PT envisioned the real possibility of imposing a "pure" government to ensure that all the necessary actions for the resumption of bourgeois expansion were taken and, among them, the complete dismantling of social and labor rights, conquered over many decades of struggle. Thus, the conditions for a new preventive counter-revolution in Brazil were created, to recall the rich conceptualization of Florestan Fernandes (1975).

From the beginning of his illegitimate government, Temer presented his austerity proposals that deepened those previously initiated by Dilma. Recomposing the volatile parliamentary support base, on the one hand, Temer drastically reduced investments in education, health and public security, initiating labor reforms, with the aim of destroying the consolidation of labor laws (CLT), created in 1943; on the other hand, it has greatly expanded the interests of financial capital in the conduct of his government's economic policy.

It is also worth emphasizing that, in addition to its prominent role in the removal of President Dilma, the Brazilian Judiciary continues to act intensely and selectively in the sense of repressing the social and trade union movements of the indigenous peoples, implementing an exception legislation that seeks to ensure "transparency and social peace" to the new government that is called the "Order and Progress".

The first results of this intense and selective performance could be seen in the municipal elections of October 2016, as a possible measure, with the fall of PT from the third largest party to tenth place. The number of municipalities under its control decreased from 630 to 256, which means a fall of almost 60% (G1, 2016).

This percentage of fall was practically repeated in the number of votes that PT candidates received, when compared to the 2012 elections. The mark of corruption, which the PT, for decades, attributed to the other parties and used as a flag, calling for "ethics in politics", turned against it.

But it must be added that the political, judicial and media actions that have led to the coup and that support the new government have not targeted only the PT. The entire left spectrum has been or is being reached by the ultra-conservative and even autocratic measurements.

Conclusion

The crisis that struck the second Dilma government (2015/6) reached a boiling point that resonated at the various levels: political, economic, social and institutional. As we try to indicate, this situation has unfolded from a complex combination of more or less simultaneous elements: 1) expansion of the international economic crisis and its effects in Brazil, which collapsed the PT myth of the commodity-based growth model, the expansion of consumption and the domestic market, and the false idea that Brazil would be immune to the international crisis and prepared for any external oscillation and adversity; 2) deepening of the political crisis, either by the split opened by the ruling fractions in this new context of crisis, or by the advance of complaints of corruption involving, once again, part of the political summit and the PT government; 3) destabilization of the arc of alliances that supported the Dilma government, with the dissension opened by the PMDB and much of the allied base, completely collapses the parliamentary political base that gave support to the PT governments, and finally; 4) Popular discontent that intensified with the "fiscal adjustment" measures of the second Dilma's government in 2015, which further penalized the working class, generating the explosion of unemployment in Brazil.

Finally, the crisis of the Dilma's government must be understood in the framework of the end of the cycle of a model of government conceived and built from a skillful policy of polyclassist conciliation, particularly under the leadership of Lula, capable of articulating, over three consecutive terms of the PT, deep concessions to the different sectors of the ruling classes, together with measures of redistribution of income to the most impoverished sectors, in addition to the expansion of the minimum wage policy, which caused both the increase in the consumption of wage goods, and significantly increased the indebtedness of the working class.

We also saw that, as there was an effective increase in employment and expansion of formal jobs, there were clear traces of contractual and wage precariousness, high levels of turnover, also living with a huge expansion of outsourced employment.

We must also consider, as we have indicated earlier, the incorporation of important segments of the trade union and popular movement into the structures of the state. This integration of part of the trade unions to the few positions available in the most diverse spheres of government, on the one hand strengthened the constitution of a new social sector within the state apparatus, on the other hand, worked as an important tool to brake and control the social and trade union mobilizations of the one that in the recent past defined itself as a new autonomous and independent syndicalism (Antunes; Santana, 2014; Antunes; Silva, 2015).

This new form of action of the new syndicalism, now part of the power, metamorphosed gradually into a negotiating and conciliatory variant, helping to disorganize the Brazilian working class, making it difficult – when not preventing – for its syndically more organized sectors to confront some of the structural pillars that preserve the Brazilian

capitalism, such as the concentrated structure of rural property, the exorbitant profits of the bourgeoisie (financial, industrial, agricultural, commercial and services), the great fortunes, a more progressive taxation that mainly taxed the bourgeois classes, etc.. None of these measures were even initiated by the PT governments.

Totally wrapped in a seemingly successful policy of polyclassist conciliations, the PT governments refused a minimally more confrontational stance. In addition to the examples above, another one can be added, which played a vital role in the coup: the discussion about the breaking of the monopoly of private media has not even been attempted.

In this way, the PT, stuck to the government, did not encourage the possibilities of resistance and advancement of the organized social and trade union struggle, did not activate the social movements that were close to it and did not seek links with others that were outside the orbit of the Labour Party. And when it tried to do it, during the final phase of impeachment, was already too late. Faced with the heavy artillery that was directed to it, it became more and more defensive, having to seek judicial and institutional solutions.

In 2013, before the rebellions that shook Brazil, it proved to be uncapable of understanding them. In the second round of the October 2014 elections, the risk of conservative victory of the PSDB produced an intense mobilization that was decisive for Dilma's victory. Soon after, this mobilization was left aside and Dilma and the PT made a victory speech inviting the opposition to the union and, after the inauguration, her government implemented a drastic fiscal adjustment, advocated by the more conservative opposition.

It was then forged the "ideal alternative" of the bourgeois classes. The conditions were created for the outbreak of a coup, a new variant of goal already practiced in Honduras and Paraguay, for which a legal remedy was needed. It was there that a political praxis developed characterized by a double and articulated movement, characterized by the judicialization of politics and the politicization of justice, with the full support of the large media corporations.

And thus, Brazil, which seemed to follow a new and auspicious course, entered, once again, a new phase of deep regression, with the basic finality of operating a much more aggressive neoliberal deepening, with the attribution of privatizing the state companies that had been preserved and, on the other hand, destroy in depth the rights of work conquered over more than a century. Bolsonaro's electoral victory in 2018 sealed this tragic period and marked the beginning of a second phase, then much deeper, of preventive counterrevolution in Brazil (Antunes, 2020). But this is already another story.

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